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INTRODUCTION
Today, it is difficult to pinpoint what the “average” American
1
family looks like. While many children are raised in the typical two-
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parent household, others are brought up in single-parent homes and
have grandparents, siblings, babysitters, and day care workers who play
2
a dominant role in caring and providing for them. While no legal right
3
4
to visitation existed for third parties at common law, states began
passing third party visitation statutes in the 1960s to protect children’s
5
relationships with third parties. While all of these statutes currently
allow grandparents to petition the court for visitation with their
6
grandchildren, some also permit siblings to ask for continued contact
7
with their brother(s) and/or sister(s). As a result, trial judges are forced
to decide whether to grant third party petitions for visitation with a child
8
over the objection of the child’s legal parents.
Many children and adults seeking sibling visitation either are or
9
have been in foster care or have a sibling presently in foster care. As of
September 30, 2009, nearly 500,000 children in the United States were
10
in the foster care system. Alarmingly, sixty-five to eighty-five percent
of these children had at least one sibling, and roughly thirty percent of

Wake Forest University, cum laude, 2007. I would like to thank Professor Solangel
Maldonado for her valuable insight and guidance throughout the writing process and my
family for their continued love and support.
1
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
2
Id. at 63-64; SUSAN SCARF MERRELL, THE ACCIDENTAL BOND 12 (1995).
3
In visitation and child custody disputes, a third party is considered to be any person
other than a child’s biological or adoptive parents. See Argenio v. Fenton, 703 A.2d 1042,
1044 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1997) (“Disputes involving custody of a minor child, other than those
involving a parent against another parent, are considered to be ‘third-party’ disputes.”).
4
See, e.g., In re Ash, 507 N.W. 2d 400, 402 (Iowa 1993) (“Custodial parents have a
common law veto power over visitation between the child and all other third parties, except
the non-custodial parent.”).
5
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 64; Ellen Marrus, Over the Hills and Through the Woods to
Grandparents’ House We Go: Or Do We, Post-Troxel?, 43 ARIZ. L. REV. 751, 772 (2001).
6
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 74 n.1.
7
Examples of states permitting siblings to petition the court for visitation include
Louisiana, New Jersey, and New York. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 136 (West 1999) (relatives
by blood or affinity, former stepparents, or stepgrandparents); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §
9:344(C) (West 2000) (grandparents and siblings); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1(a) (West
2010) (grandparents and siblings); N.Y DOM. REL. LAW § 71 (McKinney 1999 & Supp.
2003) (siblings).
8
Marrus, supra note 5, at 772.
9
I thank Professor Solangel Maldonado for this observation. Conversation with
Solangel Maldonado, Professor, Seton Hall University School of Law (Jan. 10, 2011).
10
The exact number of children in the foster care system was 423,773. The AFCARS
Report, U.S. DEP’T OF HEATH AND HUMAN SERV., http://www.acf.hhs.gov/
programs/cb/stats_research/ afcars/tar/report17.htm (last visited Mar. 1, 2011).
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11

those children had four or more siblings. Having recognized the
12
importance of the sibling relationship, New Jersey requires in its Child
13
Placement Bill of Rights Act that the State make “best efforts” to place
14
siblings together when they are removed from their homes. However,
if this is not possible, the State must facilitate regular visitation between
15
siblings. After adoption, New Jersey’s Grandparent and Sibling
Visitation Statute affords siblings the opportunity to petition the court
for continued visitation with their brother(s) and/or sister(s), subject to a
16
best interests inquiry.
In interpreting third party visitation statutes, courts have taken
widely different approaches. In Troxel v. Granville, the seminal case
concerning third party visitation, the Supreme Court analyzed the
constitutionality of a Washington statute allowing “‘any person’ to
petition a superior court for visitation rights ‘at any time,’ and
authoriz[ing] that court to grant such visitation rights whenever
17
‘visitation may serve the best interest of the child.’” The Court held
that the statute was unconstitutional because it failed to give any
“special weight” to the mother’s decision concerning what was in the
18
best interests of her daughters. After Troxel, the New Jersey Supreme
Court addressed grandparent visitation under the State’s Grandparent
19
and Visitation Statute in Moriarty v. Bradt. The Court ultimately
rejected Troxel’s “special weight” determination and instead adopted an
avoidance of harm standard, a much higher threshold than that set forth
20
by the Supreme Court. Several years later, the New Jersey Supreme
Court extended Moriarty’s avoidance of harm standard to sibling
petitions in In re D.C., holding that sibling visitation cannot be denied
under the Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute if the child at issue

11
The Sibling Bond: Its Importance in Foster Care and Adoptive Placement, NAT’L
ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE (Oct. 12, 2010), http://naic.acf.hhs.gov/pubs/f_siblin.cfm.
12
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-2(a)-(b) (West 2010).
13
The Child Placement Bill of Rights Act addresses the rights of children removed
from their homes by the State. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4 (West 2010).
14
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4(d) (West 2010).
15
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4(f) (West 2010).
16
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1(a) (West 2010).
17
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60.
18
Id. at 69-70.
19
Moriarty v. Bradt, 177 N.J. 84, 88 (2003).
20
Id. at 115.
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would be harmed by the court’s refusal to grant such contact.
In looking at the approach outlined in Troxel, as compared to
Moriarty and D.C., serious questions emerge whose answers could pose
sober realities for New Jersey siblings seeking to maintain contact with
their brother(s) and/or sister(s) after their adoption by non-relatives. For
example, Troxel and D.C. set forth two completely different standards
concerning third party visitation. Troxel does not require evidence that
22
the child will suffer harm if contact with the third party is denied.
Rather, it merely obligates the court to give special weight or deference
to the parent’s determination that visitation with the petitioner would
23
not be in the child’s best interests. However, Moriarty requires
evidence that the child will be harmed before the court can order contact
24
with the petitioner over the objections of the child’s legal parent, and
25
D.C. applies this avoidance of harm standard to siblings. These
different standards require lawmakers to examine which standard
furthers the child’s best interests, in light of the differing definitions of
sibling relationships and the sibling bond. Moreover, under the
“stringent” avoidance of harm inquiry, many siblings may not have
sufficient resources to show that a child would suffer harm, even if
harm to the child would likely occur.
This Note argues that while the avoidance of harm standard is
possibly suitable in some third party visitation cases, such as those
involving a grandparent, it is not appropriate in post-adoption sibling
visitation cases because of the special bond shared between siblings, the
critical role that siblings play in a child’s development, and the potential
chilling effect that this standard could have on sibling visitation.
Instead, the New Jersey Supreme Court should adopt a presumption that
denying sibling contact after adoption will cause the child harm. This
presumption is supported by social science and psychological studies
and will deter the potential chilling effect of the avoidance of harm
standard on sibling visitation petitions.
Part I of this Note discusses how states define sibling relationships
and what the sibling bond entails. It will show that states often vary in
how they classify “siblings” and that children’s definitions differ
21
22
23
24
25

In re D.C., 203 N.J. 545, 573 (2010).
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
Id. at 69.
Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 115.
In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 573.
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markedly from state designations. Furthermore, it will describe the bond
shared between siblings, one that is emotionally powerful and vitally
26
important throughout both childhood and the duration of one’s life.
This bond frequently intensifies between siblings who are subject to
abuse and neglect by their parents because they learn from a young age
that they must rely upon their brother(s) and/or sister(s) in order to deal
27
with their shared problems at home.
Part II of this Note examines New Jersey’s Child Placement Bill of
Rights Act and Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute. It will also
analyze the Troxel, Moriarty, and D.C. decisions to illustrate the
different standards applied by the United States Supreme Court and the
New Jersey Supreme Court in third party visitation cases.
Finally, Part III will evaluate the issues raised between the Troxel
and D.C. inquiries and discuss two specific problems that emerge. First,
applying the avoidance of harm standard in cases of sibling visitation
does not give enough deference to the extensive research on the sibling
bond and largely ignores the fact that the sibling relationship becomes
more important for children who have been exposed to abuse and
28
neglect by their parents. Second, the D.C. holding could chill sibling
petitions for post-adoption visitation. Siblings may feel overwhelmed by
the “stringent” burden that the avoidance of harm standard imposes and
choose not to pursue visitation because of the grey area in current legal
analysis. Because of these problems, the avoidance of harm standard is
29
not appropriate for cases involving post-adoption sibling visitation.

26
Sibling Issues in Foster Care and Adoption, CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY (Dec.
2006), http://www.childwelfare.gov/pubs/siblingissues/siblingissues.pdf.
27
NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11.
28
Mary Anne Herrick & Wendy Piccus, Sibling Connections: The Importance of
Nurturing Sibling Bonds in the Foster Care System, 27 CHILD. AND YOUTH SERV. REV. 5,
available at http://media-server.amazon.com/exec/drm/amzproxy.cgi.
29
This paper takes no position on whether the avoidance of harm standard is
appropriate in some sibling visitation cases. Rather, it is concerned only with post-adoption
sibling visitation because in these cases, the sibling provides the child’s single connection to
his or her natural family. Additionally, the child needs the sibling more than in cases where
he or she is still living with the natural family.
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I. SOCIAL SCIENCE AND PSYCHOLOGICAL STUDIES ON THE
SIBLING RELATIONSHIP
A. What Constitutes a Sibling Relationship?
Across the country, states vary in how they define sibling
relationships and in their policies regarding sibling placement and
30
visitation. Some states provide that children who have a biological
parent in common constitute siblings, while others maintain that step31
siblings are, in fact, siblings. The primary difficulty with current state
definitions is that they often leave out groups that children identify as
32
33
siblings, such “fictive kin” and foster care co-residents. Moreover,
judicial enforcement of state statutes permitting sibling visitation often
depends on whether the siblings have an established, personal
34
relationship before their entrance into state custody. In New York, for
example, courts hold that although the legislature favors the sibling
relationship once siblings are placed outside the home, the State is not
required to place siblings together if they have never met and does not

30

CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 26.
Arizona law states that “‘sibling’ includes a person who shares a common biological
parent, stepparent, or adoptive parent.” ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 8-543(F) (LexisNexis 2010).
Likewise, under California law, “‘sibling’ means a child related to another person by blood,
adoption, or affinity through a common legal or biological parent.” CAL. WELF. & INST.
CODE § 362.1(3)(c) (West 2010). Furthermore, Iowa law provides that “‘[s]ibling’ means an
individual who is related to another individual by blood, adoption, or affinity through a
common legal or biological parent.” IOWA CODE § 232.2(52) (2010).
32
In child advocacy, the phrase “fictive kin” is used to describe relationships where a
child has a strong, enduring bond with another child who is not, in fact, their biological
sibling. CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 26.
33
Children are generally less formal in their distinctions concerning who is or is not
their brother or sister. Specifically, children who are part of the foster care system often
develop connections with children who may or may not be their biological siblings. These
children have been found to view any of the following as their sibling: “full or half-siblings,
including any children who were relinquished or removed at birth; step-siblings; other close
relatives or non-relatives living in the same kinship home; foster children in the same
family; orphanage mates or group-home mates with a close, enduring relationship; and
children of the partner or former partner of the child’s parent.” CHILD WELFARE INFO.
GATEWAY, supra note 26; Aron Shlonsky et al., The Other Kin: Setting the Course for
Research, Policy, and Practice with Siblings in Foster Care, 27 CHILD. AND YOUTH SERV.
REV. 697, 707, available at www.elsevier.com/locate/childyouth.
34
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 26.
31
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35

have to facilitate sibling contact. Although the New Jersey Legislature
has not specifically defined a “sibling relationship,” it has set forth
procedures in its Child Placement Bill of Rights Act and Grandparent
and Sibling Visitation Statute governing sibling visitation pre- and post36
adoption. These provisions will be discussed in-depth later in this
Note.
B. The Sibling Bond
Over the past two decades, the relationship between siblings has
37
increasingly become recognized as playing a part in a child’s growth.
Until the 1980s, little research existed concerning the bond between
38
siblings. However, as social scientists began realizing the importance
of this relationship, research on the impact that sibling relationships
39
have on a child’s emotional welfare gained traction. Today, researchers
and courts alike acknowledge the significance of the sibling bond and
40
the influence it has on a child’s development.
Brothers and sisters share a bond unlike that experienced between
41
any other persons. Sibling relationships frequently span the course of
42
a lifetime, and for many individuals, “it is the longest lasting
relationship [they] have, longer than the parent/child or husband/wife
43
relationship.” Research shows that children who maintain a positive
relationship with their sibling(s) possess a higher degree of self-worth,
are less likely to experience loneliness, and behave better than siblings
44
who do not. Specifically, recent studies from the United Kingdom
suggest that both younger and older individuals who grow up with a
sister are happier and more optimistic than those who do not,
45
particularly if they have divorced parents. These psychologists contend
35

Shlonsky et al., supra note 33, at 703.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4 (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 2010).
37
Sonia J. Leathers, Separation from Siblings: Associations with Placement Adaptation
and Outcomes Among Adolescents in Long-Term Foster Care, 27 CHILD. AND YOUTH SERV.
REV. 793, 794, available at www.elsevier.com/locate/childyouth.
38
NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11.
39
NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11; In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 560.
40
In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 561.
41
NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11.
42
Shlonsky et al., supra note 33, at 698.
43
NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11.
44
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 26.
45
Deborah Tannen, Why Sisterly Chats Make People Happier, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 25,
36

SETTLEMIRE FORMATTED.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

172

SETON HALL LEGISLATIVE JOURNAL

12/5/2011 2:53 PM

Vol. 36:1

that although sisters tend to discuss more personal topics with one
another than with their brothers, these sibling communications
46
nevertheless strengthen connections with one another.
The sibling bond changes and develops over the course of one’s
47
life, largely because brothers and sisters are constantly evolving.
According to one author, “[o]ur siblings . . . affect us from earliest
childhood onward in a variety of ways: [w]e share space in the family
with them, we learn from them and teach them, we divide up parental
loyalties with them, we envy them, admire them, dominate them, hate
48
them, love them.” Throughout their early years, a child’s interaction
with his or her brother(s) and sister(s) sets the groundwork for a large
49
percentage of his or her later intimate relationships. Siblings comprise
a child’s initial peer group, and children develop social skills from
50
negotiating with their brothers and sisters. It is through these
interactions that they, as children, develop their ability to connect with
51
their larger world. During adolescence, siblings generally attempt to
exercise their independence and individuality, which commonly strains
52
their once-close ties. However, during adulthood, the sibling bond will
53
frequently re-develop and grow stronger than ever before. The bond
54
generally becomes strongest when brothers and sisters reach old age.
This is largely because siblings often become each other’s companions
once again, as they are alone with their parents and spouses having
already passed away and/or their children having left home to venture
55
into adulthood. At this point in their journeys, some siblings choose to
56
live together for the rest of their lives.
Although children who are raised in functional families bond with
57
their sibling(s), the sibling relationship often takes on more importance

2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/26/health/26essay.html.
46
Id.
47
MERRELL, supra note 2, at 11.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 26.
51
NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11.
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
Id.
56
Id.
57
NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11.
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for children who have been exposed to abuse and neglect by their
58
parents. Deprived children learn from a young age that they must rely
upon their sibling(s) in order to deal with their shared problems at
59
home. When children are placed in the foster care system, they
frequently experience significant grief because of the separation from,
60
and loss of, continuous contact with their parents. Many of these
61
children want to maintain contact with their biological parents, and
“the continued presence of siblings may be vital for maintaining a sense
of safety and emotional continuity in an unknown and potentially
62
frightening situation.”
However, siblings who are separated from each other during this
period, or at adoption, are forced to go through the grieving process for
a second time, which can exacerbate their original feelings of guilt and
63
loneliness and be even more devastating. In 1999, researchers
conducted a series of interviews with children entering the foster care
system; they found that these children frequently experienced feelings
of worry about their brother(s) and/or sister(s) and narrated their lives
64
with detailed accounts of their sibling relationship(s). Other studies
indicate that “many children believe they have lost a part of themselves
when they are separated from their brothers and sisters, and their grief at
this loss is aggravated by the worry and guilt they feel when they enter
65
care.” Furthermore, siblings separated from one another often struggle
with creating and maintaining a positive self-identity, which causes
66
them to feel worthless, unwanted, or unlovable. Thus, child advocacy
scholars contend that maintaining the sibling relationship is extremely
important for children who are removed from their homes because it
allows them to preserve a sense of stability in a chaotic set of
67
circumstances.
The New Jersey Legislature and courts view the sibling bond as
58

Herrick & Piccus, supra note 28, at 3.
Id.
60
NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11.
61
Solangel Maldonado, Permanency v. Biology: Making the Case for Post-Adoption
Contact, 37 CAP. U. L. REV. 321, 328 (2008).
62
Shlonsky et al., supra note 33, at 698.
63
NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11.
64
Herrick & Piccus, supra note 28, at 5.
65
Id.
66
Id.
67
Herrick & Piccus, supra note 28, at 8.
59
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unique and important, evidenced by the Legislature’s addition of
siblings to its Visitation Statute in 1987 and New Jersey courts’
68
decisions on this subject. Indeed, New Jersey courts have heeded to the
case law and scholarly writings valuing the nurturing and sustaining of
69
sibling relationships. For example, in L. v. G., the Superior Court
determined that “[a] sibling relationship can be an independent and
emotionally supportive factor for children in ways quite distinctive from
other relationships, and there are benefits and experiences that a child
reaps from a relationship with his or her brother(s) or sister(s) which
70
truly cannot be derived from any other.” The court further stated that
“[t]he bonds which develop between brothers and sisters are strong
71
ones, and are, in most cases, irreplaceable.” Similarly, in D.C., the
New Jersey Supreme Court recognized the “critical” importance of the
72
sibling bond for children who live in “chaotic circumstances.”
II. LEGISLATION AND CASE LAW ON THIRD PARTY
VISITATION STATUTES
A. New Jersey Legislation
1. Child Placement Bill of Rights Act
In New Jersey, the Child Placement Bill of Rights Act governs
73
sibling visitation once a child is removed from his or her home. Under
the Act, the Legislature recognized that a child placed outside his or her
home possesses certain rights that are independent of those maintained
by the child’s parents or legal guardian and set forth the obligations that
74
the applicable department has to the child. Specifically, with regard to
sibling relationships, the Act requires that the applicable department use
its best efforts “to place the child in the same setting with the child’s
75
sibling if the sibling is also being placed outside his home.” However,
68

In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 561.
In re Guardianship of A.M.S., 187 N.J. 556, 561 (2006).
70
203 N.J. Super. 385, 395 (1985).
71
Id. at 398.
72
In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 561.
73
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4(f) (West 2010).
74
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-2(a)-(b) (West 2010); N.J. STAT. ANN. §9:6B-3 (West 2010).
“Applicable department” means the Department of Human Services, the Department of
Children and Families, the Department of Health and Senior Services, or board of education.
75
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4(d) (West 2010).
69
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if the siblings cannot be placed together, the department must allow the
child “to visit with [his] sibling on a regular basis and to otherwise
maintain contact with [his] sibling” and to provide or arrange
76
transportation for this contact to take place.
Although New Jersey’s Division of Youth and Family Services
(“Division”) previously contended that its requirement to facilitate
sibling contact applies only during the time before parental rights have
been terminated, the New Jersey Supreme Court interpreted the Act’s
legislative history to mean that the Legislature did not intend to disrupt
sibling contact between pre- and post- termination of parental rights and
that the Division’s obligation to the child continues until the court
77
finalizes his or her adoption. The court found that under the Act,
maintaining sibling contact while children are placed outside their
78
homes is of extreme importance. The Division has a responsibility “to
nurture sibling bonds . . . whether or not a sibling has initiated the
process [of seeking access] and whether or not termination has
79
occurred.” Indeed, the Division recognizes the significance of this
obligation, believing that “[m]aintaining contact with brothers and
80
sisters supports the child’s identity and links him to his past.” If the
Division opposes visitation between the siblings for any reason, it must
demonstrate that such visitation would be harmful to the child’s health,
physical welfare, psychological well-being, and safety and would be
contrary to the child’s individual mental or physical development, as set
81
forth in the Act.
2. New Jersey Adoption Act
New Jersey’s Adoption Act applies not only in cases involving
children voluntarily relinquished at birth, but also in ones where the
court has terminated a parent’s rights and the child is subsequently
82
adopted. The Act defines when it will enter a judgment of adoption and
specifies what rights are conferred upon the adoptive family as a new

76
77
78
79
80
81
82

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:6B-4(f) (West 2010).
In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 562-564.
Id. at 564.
Id.
Id. at 565.
Id.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-44 (West 2010).
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83

unit. Consequently, once a child is adopted, the Child Placement Bill
of Rights Act no longer applies, and the Grandparent and Sibling
84
Visitation Statute governs sibling petitions for visitation.
Under the Act, the court must find “that the parent has
substantially failed to perform the regular and expected parental
functions of care and support of the child, although able to do so, or
that . . . [this] inability . . . is unlikely to change in the immediate
85
future” in order for it to enter a judgment of adoption. Once an
adoption is finalized, all of the biological parents’ rights and
responsibilities to the adopted child are terminated, except those
86
specified before the entry of judgment has been entered. At that time,
the adopting parent possesses the same relationships, responsibilities,
87
and rights as the biological parent previously did. It is the policy of
New Jersey courts to ensure that the new adoptive unit is “given the
88
right to grow and develop as an autonomous family.”
3. Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute
At common law, third parties were not permitted to petition the
court for visitation with a child, as visitation was seen exclusively as a
89
parental right. This conception changed as social scientists put research
forward that a child’s relationship with his or her grandparents was
unique and had a significant, emotional influence on the child’s
90
development. In 1972, New Jersey adopted its first Visitation Statute,
which allowed grandparents to petition the court for visitation with a
91
grandchild. Although the original Visitation Statute allowed visitation
between a child and his or her grandparent(s) only if the child’s parents
92
were deceased or divorced, the statute was later amended to afford
standing “to grandparents to seek visitation when ‘either or both of the
parents of a minor child . . . is or are deceased, or divorced or living

83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90
91
92

N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50 (West 2010).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1(a) (West 2010).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-46(a)(1)-(2) (West 2010).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50(c)(1) (West 2010).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:3-50(b) (West 2010).
In re Adoption of a Child by W.P. and M.P., 163 N.J. 158, 175 (2000).
In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 558.
Id. at 559.
Id.
Id.
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separate and apart in different habitats False” This limitation was
eliminated in 1993, thus opening the door for all grandparents to
petition the court to visit their grandchildren over the parent’s
94
opposition.
In 1987, the New Jersey Legislature recognized the impact that
sibling relationships have on a child’s emotional well-being and
95
expanded its Visitation Statute to include siblings. Under the State’s
current Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute, a sibling of a child
adopted by non-relatives may petition the court to maintain contact with
96
the child. The burden is on the sibling requesting visitation to
demonstrate, by a preponderance of the evidence, that allowing contact
97
is in the child’s best interest. In making its decision whether to permit
visitation, the court is to consider the following factors:
(1) The relationship between the child and the applicant; (2) the
relationship between each of the child’s parents or the person with
whom the child is residing and the applicant; (3) the time which has
elapsed since the child last had contact with the applicant; (4) the
effect that such visitation will have on the relationship between the
child and the child’s parents or the person with whom the child is
residing; (5) if the parents are divorced or separated, the time sharing
arrangement which exists between the parents with regard to the
child; (6) the good faith of the applicant in filing the application; (7)
any history of physical, emotional or sexual abuse or neglect by the
applicant; and (8) any other factor relevant to the best interests of the
98
child.

If the sibling petitioning the court has previously been the child’s
full-time caretaker, such history is prima facie evidence that contact
99
would be in the child’s best interests. Moreover, if a family member
adopts the child, denial of the sibling’s petition would satisfy the harm
100
requirement. The New Jersey Supreme Court believes that this
“statute is important because it reflects a constantly evolving legislative
response to changing understandings of social conditions and a
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
100

Id.
Id. at 559-560.
In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 561.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1(a) (West 2010).
In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 573.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1(b)(1)-(8) (West 2010).
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1(c) (West 2010).
In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 573.
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recognition that maintaining contacts with third parties, including
grandparents and siblings, may, in certain circumstances, be necessary
101
to the emotional health of children.”
B. Federal and New Jersey Case Law
1. Troxel v. Granville
New Jersey’s Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute is similar
to that of many states, in that it authorizes courts to order visitation over
the objections of child’s parents so long as visitation is in the child’s
102
best interests. However, in 2000, the United States Supreme Court in
Troxel v. Granville rejected the best interest standard in third party
103
visitation disputes.
There, the Court was asked to determine the
constitutionality of a Washington statute allowing “‘any person’ to
petition a superior court for visitation rights ‘at any time,’ and
authoriz[ing] that court to grant such visitation rights whenever
104
‘visitation may serve the best interest of the child.’” Brad Troxel and
Tommie Granville, an unmarried couple, had two daughters together,
105
Isabelle and Natalie. The couple ended their relationship in 1991, and
Brad, Isabelle, and Natalie spent their weekend visitation with the
106
107
Troxels. In May 1993, Brad committed suicide. While Granville
allowed her daughters to continue visiting with the Troxels after Brad’s
death, she informed them in October 1993 that she wanted to reduce
108
their visitation with Isabelle and Natalie to one short visit each month.
Two months later, the Troxels filed an action in a Washington
Superior Court seeking to obtain visitation rights with their
109
granddaughters. After hearing from both parties, the trial court found
that visitation with the Troxels was in the children’s best interest and
ordered visitation “one weekend per month, one week during the
summer, and four hours on both of the petitioning grandparents’

101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
109

Id. at 562.
N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:2-7.1 (West 2010).
Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
Id. at 60.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 60-61.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 61.
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110

birthdays.” Granville appealed, and in the interim, her new husband
111
adopted Isabelle and Natalie. The Washington Court of Appeals
reversed the trial court’s visitation order, concluding that third parties
lacked standing to petition for visitation unless there was a pending
112
custody action. The Washington Supreme Court affirmed, holding that
third parties have no right to visitation absent harm to the child and that
the statute was therefore invalid on its face because it allowed anyone to
113
seek visitation without evidence of harm to the child. Thus, the
Washington Supreme Court rejected the best interest of the child
standard and required third parties seeking visitation with a child to
114
show that the child would be harmed if visitation was denied.
115
In a 6-3 decision with six separate opinions, the Supreme Court
affirmed the judgment of the Washington Supreme Court, but on
116
different grounds. Justice O’Connor, writing for plurality, began by
noting that “[t]he liberty interest at issue in this case – the interest of
parents in the care, custody, and control of their children – is perhaps
the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court,”
which implicated the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
117
Amendment. The Court then focused on three primary factors in
118
holding that the Washington statute was unconstitutional. First, the
Court found that the statute was “breathtakingly broad” because it
allowed “any person,” not just a grandparent, to request visitation with a
119
child “at any time.” Second, Granville never denied the Troxels access
to her daughters; rather, she merely cut down the amount of visitation
120
time to one short visit each month. Finally, by failing to give
Granville’s determination of her daughters’ best interest any special
weight, the trial court violated the traditional presumption that a fit

110

Id.
Id. at 61-62.
112
Id. at 62.
113
Id. at 62-63.
114
Id. at 63.
115
Solangel Maldonado, When Father (or Mother) Doesn’t Know Best: Quasi-Parents
and Parental Deference After Troxel v. Granville, 88 IOWA L. REV. 865, 877 (2003).
116
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 63.
117
Id. at 65.
118
Maldonado, supra note 115, at 879.
119
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 67.
120
Id. at 71.
111
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parent will take action in his or her child’s best interests. According to
Justice O’Connor, “if a fit parent’s decision of the kind at issue here
becomes subject to judicial review, the court must accord at least some
122
special weight to the parent’s own determination.”
However, in reaching its decision, the Court did not apply strict
123
scrutiny, even though the case involved a fundamental right.
Moreover, the Court did not consider whether the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment mandates that all third party visitation
statutes require evidence of actual or potential harm to the child before
courts may grant visitation, the principal constitutional question at issue
124
in the case. Rather, the Court chose to “rest [its] decision on the
sweeping breadth [of the statute] and the application of that broad,
125
unlimited power” and declined to define the scope of parents’
Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Right when third party visitation is
126
at issue. Thus, as the Supreme Court left the case, no evidence of harm
to the child is required; instead, courts must only ensure that parents’
127
decisions of their child’s best interests are given special weight.
Justice Souter and Justice Thomas both entered concurrences to the
128
judgment. Justice Souter argued that the Court’s decision should be
affirmed because the Washington Supreme Court correctly invalidated
the statute based on the broad nature of the statute’s text, not because of
129
how it was applied to any particular case. Consequently, he believed
that there was no reason to determine if harm was required or to
130
contemplate the scope of parental rights. In his concurring opinion,
Justice Thomas agreed with the plurality in its recognition that parents
have a fundamental right to make decisions regarding the welfare of
their children but believed that the Court erred in failing to articulate the
131
correct standard of review. According to Justice Thomas, this

121
122
123
124
125
126
127
128
129
130
131

Id. at 69-70.
Id. at 70.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 69-70.
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 75, 80.
Id. at 75 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 77 (Souter, J., concurring).
Id. at 80 (Thomas, J., concurring).
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fundamental parental right should, in fact, be subject to strict scrutiny.
Justice Stevens, Justice Scalia, and Justice Kennedy dissented from
133
the plurality. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Stevens rejected a
requirement that evidence of actual or potential harm to a child must
first be demonstrated before a court may grant a third party’s visitation
request, claiming that such a condition is not supported by the Court’s
134
prior decisions. Instead, Justice Stevens supported a balancing
approach, in which all of the parties’ interests would be weighed against
one another in a court’s determination of whether the third party’s
135
petition for visitation with the child should be granted. Justice Scalia,
dissenting from the plurality, did not believe that federal judges were in
136
the best position to vindicate parental rights. Rather, Justice Scalia
concluded that state legislatures should be the ones charged with the
task of defending the rights of parents because “[they] have the great
advantages of doing harm in a more circumscribed area, of being able to
correct their mistakes in a flash, and of being removable by the
137
people.” Finally, Justice Kennedy agreed that the Due Process Clause
of the Fourteenth Amendment protects a parent’s right to raise his or her
child without undue intrusion by the state but argued that the
Constitution does not prohibit the application of the best interests
138
standard to prevent the risk of harm.
2. Moriarty v. Bradt
Although the Supreme Court did not require evidence of harm to a
child before a court could order visitation with a third party over the
139
140
legal parents’ objections, some states require just that. New Jersey,
141
for example, is one of those states. In Moriarty v. Bradt, the New

132

Id. (Thomas, J., concurring).
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 80, 91, 93.
134
Id. at 85-86 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
135
Id. (Stevens, J., dissenting).
136
Id. at 92-93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
137
Id. at 93 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
138
Id. at 95, 99 (Kennedy, J., dissenting).
139
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
140
California, Connecticut, and Kentucky all require evidence of harm to a child before
the court will go to a best interests analysis. In re Harris, 112 Cal Rptr. 2d 127, 141 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2001); Roth v. Weston, 789 A.2d 431, 447-48 (Conn. 2002); Scott v. Scott, 80 S.W.3d
447, 451 (Ky. Ct. App. 2002).
141
Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 115.
133
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Jersey Supreme Court examined what standard applies to a
grandparent’s petition to the court for visitation with a child in light of
New Jersey’s Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute and the
142
Supreme Court’s decision in Troxel. In 1987, Patrick Moriarty
(“Moriarty”) and Julia Bradt (“Bradt”) married, and by 1990, the couple
143
had two children, Brian and Tara. Moriarty and Bradt later separated,
and in order to secure visitation with Brian and Tara in light of Bradt’s
drug abuse, Lynn and Patricia Bradt (“the Bradts”), grandparents to the
144
children, intervened in the divorce action. At a hearing on the Bradts’
action, Moriarty was granted custody of Brian and Tara, and the Bradts
145
were given visitation with the children every other weekend. Once the
divorce between Moriarty and Bradt was finalized, Moriarty was
awarded sole custody of Brian and Tara, and Bradt was given
146
supervised visitation in the presence of her parents. However, in 1994,
the court granted Bradt unsupervised visitation with her children, and
the grandparents visited with Brian and Tara during most of their
147
daughter’s weekends with them. During this time, significant hostility
148
developed between Moriarty and the Bradts. Bradt passed away in
149
November 1999 from a drug overdose, and soon after, Moriarty
sought to cease Brian and Tara’s visitation with their maternal
150
grandparents. Based on court-ordered diagnostic evaluations on
Moriarty, the Bradts, and the children, Family Services recommended
151
that the Bradts have unsupervised visitation with Brian and Tara. This
was largely because it believed “the grandparents ‘could serve as a
conduit with the children’s deceased mother and [could] be a positive
152
resource for the children in many ways.’”
Moriarty filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that in
light of Troxel, the trial court was compelled to defer to his decision

142
143
144
145
146
147
148
149
150
151
152

Id. at 88.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 88-89.
Id. at 89.
Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 89.
Id.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 90-91.
Id. at 91-92.
Id. at 91.
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concerning grandparent visitation. Moriarty’s motion was ultimately
154
denied by the trial court. It instead ordered that the children were to
have monthly visitation and one extended summer visitation with their
155
grandparents. The Appellate Division later reversed the trial court’s
decision, holding that Moriarty’s substantive due process rights were
156
violated by the order of grandparent visitation.
The New Jersey Supreme Court reversed the decision of the
157
Appellate Division and reinstated the trial court’s order. While the
United States Supreme Court declined in Troxel to designate the
appropriate level of scrutiny for third party visitation cases, the New
Jersey Supreme Court held that grandparent petitions for contact under
the Grandparent and Sibling Visitation Statute are subject to strict
scrutiny because a fundamental right (e.g., a parent’s right to autonomy
158
in raising his or her child(ren)) is at issue. Furthermore, the court
found Troxel’s special weight standard inadequate because “avoiding
harm to the child is polestar and the constitutional imperative that is
necessary to overcome the presumption in favor of the parent’s decision
159
and to justify intrusion into family life.” Under the avoidance of harm
standard adopted by the court, the State may not infringe on a parent’s
fundamental right to raise his or child when there is no harm threatening
160
the child’s welfare.
However, when harm is shown by a
preponderance of the evidence and the presumption favoring a fit
parent’s decision-making capacity is overcome, the trial court is to
create a visitation schedule for the grandparents and the child in line
161
with the child’s best interests. The court determined that Brian and
Tara would be harmed if visitation with their grandparents were limited
because the children’s relationship with the Bradts allowed them to
162
connect with their deceased mother. Therefore, while Troxel declined
to address whether harm to the child must be shown under the

153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162

Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 92-93.
Id. at 93.
Id.
Id. at 94.
Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 95, 122.
Id. at 114.
Id. at 113.
Id. at 115.
Id. at 117.
Id. at 119.
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Constitution for the court to grant third party visitation, Moriarty
adopted the avoidance of harm standard as necessary to protect the right
164
to parental autonomy.
3. In re D.C.
Troxel and Moriarty both involved petitions for visitation with a
165
grandchild. Additionally, in each case, the children at issue were
166
living with a natural parent. In In re D.C., the New Jersey Supreme
Court addressed, for the first time, the applicable standards for sibling
visitation petitions when the sibling is in foster care and after the sibling
167
is adopted. In 2005, twins Dana and Donna and brother Hugo were
168
removed from their mother’s care by the Division. The twins were
169
placed in a foster home and Hugo was placed in a group home. The
170
children also had an adult sister, Nellie. In early 2006, Nellie
requested the Department of Social Services (“Department”) in
Richmond, Virginia, her home location, to evaluate her as a placement
171
candidate for her three younger siblings. The Department first
recommended that Hugo be placed in Nellie’s care, and then in August
172
2007, suggested that Nellie take the twins as well. However, in
December 2007, the Department withdrew its approval to place Dana
and Donna with Nellie, referencing Hugo’s declining grades and
173
Nellie’s financial difficulties in its reasoning. During the same month,
174
the court terminated the mother’s parental rights to all three children.
Shortly thereafter, the Division informed Nellie that visitation with the
175
twins was to be terminated.

163

Troxel, 530 U.S. at 73.
Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 114-15.
165
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60; Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 90.
166
In Troxel, the children at issue were living with their natural mother, Tommie
Granville. Troxel, 530 U.S. at 60-61. The children at issue in Moriarty were living with their
natural father, Patrick Moriarty. Moriarty, 177 N.J. at 89.
167
In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 550-51.
168
Id. at 552.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 552-53.
172
Id. at 553.
173
In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 553.
174
Id. at 554.
175
Id.
164
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Nellie filed an action seeking placement of the twins, Dana and
176
Donna, in her care, or, alternatively, for visitation. The trial judge held
that the twins’ foster mother was to retain custody but permitted Nellie
177
to visit her sisters. However, a visitation schedule was not set out by
the court, and just one month later, the twins’ foster mother refused to
178
allow Nellie maintain contact with her sisters. Nellie filed a motion to
179
enforce the trial judge’s order. The court refused to enforce the order
and concluded that “the best interests of the children ‘trumped’ any
rights that Nellie had as a sibling . . . [and] she was not in a position to
re-litigate the plan of the Division, which remained foster home
180
adoption.” The Appellate Division affirmed, holding that the Division
did not thwart Nellie’s attempts to visit with her sisters, no sibling
relationship existed between Nellie and her sisters, and the best interests
181
of the twins would not be served by continued contact with Nellie. On
appeal, Nellie challenged the material facts regarding the twins’ best
interests and contended that there was an abuse of discretion by the trial
judge in her decision not to conduct an evidentiary hearing concerning
182
her visitation request.
In a unanimous decision, the New Jersey Supreme Court
183
reversed. The court first determined that the Child Placement Bill of
Rights Acts governs sibling visitation once a child is removed from his
184
or her home. In dissecting the legislative history and specific language
of the statute, the court concluded that the Act applies to children
throughout the entire pre-adoption placement frame and that the
Division has an “affirmative obligation” to facilitate sibling contact
185
during this time. Here, the court found that the Division failed to
fulfill its responsibilities to the siblings under the Act because it did
186
little to facilitate contact between Dana, Donna, Nellie, and Hugo.

176
177
178
179
180
181
182
183
184
185
186

In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 554.
Id. at 555-56.
Id. at 556.
Id.
Id.
Id.
In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 557.
Id. at 577.
Id. at 562.
Id. at 563-64.
Id. at 566.
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In deciding whether Nellie and Hugo have the right to petition
the court for visitation with their twin sisters after their imminent
adoption, the court began by observing, as in Moriarty, that while
adoptive families, like natural families, have a right to family integrity,
188
that right is not absolute. Under the parens patriae doctrine, the State
189
must intercede when “necessary to prevent harm to a child.” However,
the State could not interfere with parents’ (adoptive or biological)
constitutional right to direct their children’s upbringing simply because
190
it would be in the children’s best interests. The Court determined that
[A]pplication of the best interests standard to a third party’s petition
for visitation is an affront to the family’s right to privacy and
autonomy and . . . interference with a biological or adoptive family’s
decision-making can only be justified on the basis of the exercise of
191
our parens patriae jurisdiction to avoid harm to the child.

Thus, under the avoidance of harm standard (the same standard
applied in Moriarty in the context of grandparent visitation), a court
may award a sibling visitation with his or her brother(s) and sister(s)
only if the sibling establishes, by a preponderance of the evidence, that
such visitation is necessary to prevent the child from experiencing
192
harm. The court noted that under this “stringent” standard, siblings
having no connection to one another or those with a toxic relationship
193
would be denied visitation. The Court remanded the case for an
expedited evidentiary hearing so that Nellie could provide evidence,
subject to the avoidance of harm standard, that Dana and Donna would
194
be harmed if denied contact with her and Hugo.
III. PROTECTING CHILDREN’S INTEREST: THE
PRESUMPTION OF HARM STANDARD
As discussed previously, a sibling may be granted visitation with
his or her brother(s) and sister(s) adopted by a non-relative under New
187

Hugo is now over the age of eighteen but still lives with Nellie. While he was in a
group home, Hugo visited regularly with his twin sisters. Id. at 552, 575.
188
In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 568 (citing Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67
(1944)).
189
Id. at 569 (quoting Fawzy v. Fawzy, 199 N.J. 456, 474-75 (2009)).
190
Id. at 573.
191
Id.
192
Id.
193
Id. at 575.
194
In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 574-75
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Jersey’s avoidance of harm standard only if the sibling establishes,
through a preponderance of the evidence, that such visitation is essential
195
to prevent the child from experiencing harm. “The signal value of the
harm requirement is that it establishes a qualitative legal standard—not
a procedural or evidentiary barrier—that is distinct from the ‘best
196
interests’ test.” Accordingly, “a finding that visitation would be in the
child’s best interests — i.e., that the child would be better off if
visitation were allowed compared to if visitation were denied — does
197
not suffice to justify the interference with the parents’ rights.” This
standard differs drastically from the Supreme Court’s holding in Troxel,
where the Court determined that it must give deference to the parents’
198
determination of the child’s best interest. New Jersey’s heightened
standard is not appropriate because it fails to give deference to the
voluminous research on the sibling bond and could have a potential
chilling effect on post-adoption sibling visitation requests. Instead, the
New Jersey Supreme Court should adopt a presumption that denying
sibling visitation after adoption will cause the child harm. This
presumption is efficient and supported by social science and
psychological studies.
A. D.C. Gives Minimal Deference to Expansive Research on the
Sibling Bond
As discussed before, social science and psychological studies on
the sibling bond find that the relationship between brother(s) and/or
sister(s) often becomes more important for children whose parents
199
abused and/or neglected them. For these children, the relationship they
maintain with their siblings frequently provides them with the comfort
200
and stability necessary to deal with their chaotic set of circumstances.
However, the application of the avoidance of harm standard to siblings
195

Id. at 573-74.
Brief for Petitioner at 6, Fausey v. Hiller, 549 U.S. 1304 (2006) (No. 06-863). In
Hiller v. Fausey, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court affirmed the Superior Court’s order of
visitation between a child and his maternal grandmother, finding that Pennsylvania’s statute
providing for “partial custody or visitation to grandparents upon the death of their child who
is also the grandchild’s parent” survived strict scrutiny analysis. 588 Pa. 342, 344 (2006).
197
Eugene Volokh, Sibling Visitation, THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 24, 2010),
http://volokh.com/2010/09/30/sibling-visitation/.
198
Troxel, 530 U.S. at 69-70.
199
Herrick & Piccus, supra note 28, at 5.
200
Id. at 6.
196
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in D.C. gives little deference to the importance of this research. Instead,
the court’s holding provides that “visitation may only be ordered when
there’s a finding that denying visitation would cause ‘a substantial
201
likelihood’ of ‘serious physical or psychological harm’ to the child.”
Unfortunately, it is unlikely that much of the research on the
sibling bond rises to the level of the avoidance of harm standard. For
example, the importance of the sibling relationship throughout
childhood and the duration of one’s life, which largely stems from the
individual’s development and the benefits associated with
companionship, would likely not be sufficient for a court to grant
contact between siblings post-adoption under the harm standard because
202
no grave physical or psychological harm would necessarily result.
Likewise, the fact that the sibling relationship is the longest relationship
that most have in a lifetime would also probably fail to meet the harm
203
requirement. Nevertheless, these research findings are extremely
important to how one evolves over the course of his or her life, and it
must be realized that “[a]n order of adoption does not erase the
emotional bonds children may have with their birth family, especially
204
when siblings from abusive homes are split apart by the adoption.”
Therefore, by adopting a presumption that denying sibling contact after
adoption will cause the child harm, the New Jersey Supreme Court
would rightly recognize the significance of this body of research and the
fact that an entry of adoption does not simply take away the importance
of the sibling relationship.
B. D.C. Could Potentially Chill Sibling Petitions for Visitation in
New Jersey
The application of the avoidance of harm standard to siblings, as
set forth in D.C., could also chill sibling petitions for visitation with a
brother or sister adopted by non-relatives.
First, as discussed
previously, the burden is on the sibling to demonstrate, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that the child at issue would suffer harm
205
if visitation it not granted. The court itself understands that this

201
202
203
204
205

Volokh, supra note 197.
CHILD WELFARE INFO. GATEWAY, supra note 26.
NAT’L ADOPTION INFO. CLEARINGHOUSE, supra note 11.
In re Cocose, No. V-4205-04, slip op. at 1, 6 (Fam. Ct. N.Y. July 22, 2005)
In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 573-74.
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standard is “stringent.” Under such a strict guideline, some siblings
may believe that whatever evidence they provide will not come close to
satisfying a showing that the child would suffer harm and, therefore,
will be deterred from petitioning the court for visitation. An additional
concern is that many siblings do not have the necessary resources that
would allow them to demonstrate that a minor sibling will suffer harm if
contact is denied, even if the child would, in fact, suffer harm. This lack
of resources may result in many siblings not even trying to seek
visitation post-adoption or being able to meet the avoidance of harm
standard, despite the likely harm present.
Questions further emerge as to what “harm” the sibling would need
to show in order for visitation to be granted. For example, the court
notes that the harm threshold would be satisfied in the case of visitation
between a sibling who has been adopted by a non-relative and the other
207
who has been taken by a grandparent. However, siblings who are
separated at birth and brought up in different households with no
208
communication would fail under the harm standard. These two
examples provided by the court are on opposite ends of the spectrum,
thereby opening up a grey area concerning petitions. Although it would
be fairly easy to discern the results of the examples provided, individual
cases do not necessarily fall into these black and white categories.
Accordingly, siblings may be dissuaded from asking the court for
visitation because of such uncertainty.
However, a presumption that denying sibling contact after adoption
will cause the child harm would assuage these concerns. First, this
presumption would lessen the burden on petitioning siblings, making it
easier for them to gather evidence and have their day in court. It would
recognize that there are, in fact, situations in which harm to a child is
present but the sibling may not have the necessary resources to rise to
the strict level of the avoidance of harm standard. Second, grey areas,
such as the ones described above, would be largely eliminated.
Although the counter-argument could be made that adopting this
presumption would open the floodgates to litigation and strain judicial
resources, public policy would be violated by allowing harm to
ultimately befall a child simply because a sibling does not have the
necessary resources to surpass a stringent avoidance of harm inquiry.
206
207
208

Id. at 575.
In re D.C., 203 N.J. at 573.
Id. at 573-74.
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IV. CONCLUSION
209

Adoption is a formation of the state, and consequently, states
210
may require certain things of individuals who wish to adopt. While
mandating post-adoption sibling contact would likely be seen as an
unconstitutional interference on an adoptive parent’s right to bring up
211
the child as he or she desired, the importance of the sibling
212
relationship cannot be denied. Therefore, siblings should be permitted
to petition a court for visitation with a brother or sister who is adopted
by non-relatives subject to a presumption that disallowing sibling
contact would harm the child.
Although critics argue that post-adoption sibling contact
obligations deter the goal of having “a system that encourages
prospective adoptive parents to adopt or at least one that does not
discourage families from adopting because of fear or additional
213
obligations,” New Jersey’s current avoidance of harm standard for
sibling visitation, promulgated by the state supreme court in D.C.,
places an unfair burden on a sibling by forcing him or her to establish,
by a preponderance of the evidence, that post-adoption contact is
214
necessary to avoid harm to the brother or sister. Given the special
bond shared between siblings and the potential chilling effect this
stringent standard could have, the Court should instead adopt a
presumption that denying sibling contact after adoption will cause the
child harm. Ultimately, in doing so, the Court will not only recognize
the importance of the prevailing social science and psychological
research, but will also acknowledge that situations do exist where harm
to a child is present but the sibling may not have the necessary resources
to rise to the strict level of the avoidance of harm.
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